Analysis of Senior-Subordinated Structures Backed by Private-Label Mortgages by Kallberg, Jarl et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Working Papers School of Hotel Administration Collection 
12-23-1997 
Analysis of Senior-Subordinated Structures Backed by Private-
Label Mortgages 
Jarl Kallberg 
New York University 
Crocker H. Liu 
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, chl62@cornell.edu 
A. R. Radhakrishnan 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kallberg, J., Liu, C. H., & Radhakrishnan, A. R. (1997). Analysis of senior-subordinated structures backed 
by private-label mortgages [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of 
Hotel Administration site: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/41 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at 
The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of 
The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Analysis of Senior-Subordinated Structures Backed by Private-Label Mortgages 
Abstract 
This paper does a valuation analysis of senior-subordinated struc ture tranches backed by non-agency 
mortgages. The valuation is done using Monte Carlo simulation and employs the CIR interest rate process 
in conjunction with an empirical model estimated for non-agency mortgage prepayments and defaults. 
The sensitivity of the value of tranches to a number of variables are analyzed. We find that the interest 
rate process parameters significantly affect prepayments and defaults but not the relative value of the 
senior tranche. It is found that with the shifting o f prepayments, the senior tranche does not dominate all 
the junior tranches at all interest rates. The shifting of prepayments has the unintended effect of providing 
stability to the junior tranches by making their cashflows less sensitive to prepayments. Our main 
conclusion is that while the shifting o f prepayments increases protection from default to the senior 
tranche for a given level of subordination, it has the unwanted effect of lowering its value through 
increased contraction risk. This value loss should be taken into account in determining the optimum level 
of subordination. 
Keywords 
tranches, mortgages, prepayment, default rate, mortgage-backed securities 
Disciplines 
Finance and Financial Management | Real Estate 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright held by the authors. 
This working paper is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/41 
Analysis of Senior-Subordinated Structures Backed by 
Private-Label Mortgages
Kose John, Crocker Liu, and A.R. Radhakrishnan*
Revision December 23, 1997
‘ Charles William Gerstenberg Professor of Banking and Finance, Associate Professor of Finance, and 
Doctored Candidate hi Finance respectively. All are from the Stern School of Business, New York Univer­
sity. We thank Michael Keenan, Pierluigi Balduzzi and Richard Levich for their comments. Address all 
correspondence to Crocker Liu, Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, 




T his paper does a  valuation analysis o f senior-subordinated struc ture tranches backed 
by non-agency mortgages. T he valuation is done using M onte Carlo sim ulation and 
employs the CIR interest rate process in conjunction w ith an em pirical m odel es­
tim ated for non-agency mortgage prepayments and defaults. T he sensitivity of the 
value of tranches to a  number o f variables are analyzed. We find that the interest rate 
process parameters significantly affect prepayments and defaults but not the relative 
value of the senior tranche. It is found that w ith  the shifting o f prepaym ents, the 
senior tranche does not dom inate all the junior tranches at all interest rates. The 
shifting o f prepaym ents has the unintended effect o f providing stability  to  the junior 
tranches by m aking their cashflows less sensitive to prepayments. Our m ain conclu­
sion is that while the sh ifting o f prepayments increases protection from default to 
the senior tranche for a  given level o f subordination, it has the unwanted effect of 
lowering its value through increased contraction risk. T his value loss should be taken 
into account in determ ining the optim um  level of subordination.
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1 Introduction
While home mortgages have been in use in the U.S. for several decades, the creation of a 
secondary market, which enabled the mortgage industry to tap funds from a broad range of 
investors, dates back only to 1970. Prior to that, banks and savings and loans used to issue 
mortgage loans and carry these illiquid loans in their asset portfolios. This meant consider­
able risk for these institutions if the local economy deteriorated and the default rate rose. In 
1970, Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), a government-chartered pri­
vate corporation, began issuing pass-through securities th a t were collateralized by pools of 
government-guaranteed mortgages. The full and timely payment of principal and interest 
were guaranteed by GNMA under the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. This 
took the default risk away from mortgages and opened the mortgage market to a wide array 
of investors. The local banks now simply originate mortgage loans according to the agency 
guidelines and then sell them to GNMA or investment banks to be securitized and sold to 
individual investors. The local banks, however, continue to service these loans. GNMA 
was soon followed by other quasi-government agencies such as FHLMC (Freddie Mac) and 
FNMA (Fannie Mae) with their own guaranteed pass-throughs. Since then the secondary 
market for agency-guaranteed securities has grown from one with generic pass-throughs to 
one with complex Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) comprising of PACs, POs, 
IOs etc and become a trillion dollar plus market. All the mortgage-backed securities that 
are guaranteed by the above agencies automatically acquire a AAA rating against default 
risk. But they are still subject to prepayment risk.
The Bank of America was the first to issue privately-issued, as opposed to government- 
guaranteed, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in 1977. The growth of the privately-issued 
market was rather slow till 1987. Since then, however, it has shown tremendous growth 
with over $90 billion of private-label MBS issued in 1992. This growth in privately-issued 
MBS arose as a result of several factors. For one, loans less than $203,000, the statutory 
limit, and loans made to mortgagors with impeccable credit rating, low debt/income ratio, 
and full documentation are eligible for agency backing. The prosperity of the 1980’s led to 
a large increase in the issuance of jumbo loans which are loans that exceed the preceding
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statutory limit. The real estate downturn and recession of the early 1990’s also created a 
large number of potential borrowers with poor credit and/or high debt-to-income ratios. 
These borrowers who would have been denied mortgages in the earlier days, found mortgage 
bankers willing to lend to them, albeit at higher interest rates and with substantial down 
payments. Both these factors, together with Resolution Trust Corporation’s (RTC) need 
to quickly securitize the unusual mortgage assets of bankrupt thrifts following the S &c L 
crisis, resulted in a large number of loans that would not qualify for agency guarantees. 
The private sector thus stepped in to pool these loans and securitize them.
Since these private label securities are not guaranteed by federal agencies, they are 
subject to default risk. Consequently, they have to be credit enhanced and rated by rating 
agencies before they are sold in the secondary market. Initially, most of these private- 
label MBSs were credit enhanced by corporate guarantees, letters of credit, surety bonds1, 
pool insurance, spread accounts2 and/or reserve funds. However, the relative scaxcity 
of financial institutions with AAA rating meant that most of the deals credit-enhanced 
through corporate guarantees were structured with only a AA rating, limiting the potential 
base for these securities. Reserve funds required that the cashflows be invested at rates 
similar to fed rates, which are low, resulting in a high cost of carry. The rating agencies 
did not give much credit to spread accounts making them very expensive. Currently, the 
majority of private-label securities use a senior-subordinate credit enhancement structure. 
Subordination involves dividing the cashflows into two tranches, senior and subordinate. 
This senior/subordinate structure is designed to protect the senior bonds at the expense 
of the subordinate bonds by first allocating the losses to the subordinates. Only after 
the subordinate principal is exhausted will the senior bond be affected by credit losses. 
In 1992, a new SEC regulation helped credit enhancement through subordination to gain 
dominance from its limited use before that. Prior to that, SEC regulations did not allow 
the lower rated subordinate bonds to be included as a publicly traded security As a result, 
the issuers had to retain them, thus affecting the capital reserve requirements due to the
'A  surety bond is a 100% guarantee on all scheduled payments of principal and interest. It differs from 
other types of insurance because there is no loss limit.
2Spread accounts use excess interest cash flow that is not allocated to other classes to offset credit losses.
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riskiness of the subordinate bonds. However, the new regulation allowed subordinated 
tranches rated BBB and above to be included as a publicly traded security. Also, Standard 
and Poor’s dramatically reduced the amount of subordination necessary to achieve a AAA 
rating in 1993. As a result, 85% of all private-label MBSs were credit-enhanced through 
subordination by 1993. (See Table 1 for amounts of non-agency issuance of MBS and the 
different types of credit enhancement types used.)
The agency-guaranteed MBSs are subject to prepayment (and interest rate) risk. Pre­
payment risk arises from the option that the mortgagors have to prepay the entire loan 
anytime during the life of the loan. This adversely affects the security holder if done for fi­
nancial reasons i.e. when the interest rate is low enough to allow the mortgagor to refinance 
at a lower rate, since the prepaid principal will have to be reinvested at the lower interest 
rate. But prepayment would prove beneficial if done at high interest rates for non-financial 
reasons such as moving out of town, divorce etc.
It is relatively easy to model the ‘optimal’ prepayment3 rate based on stochastic in­
terest rates. However, this rate does not account for mortgagors who do not refinance 
their mortgage when it is theoretically optimal to do so and prepayment for non-financial 
reasons. The prior financial literature has modeled the impact of prepayment on MBS 
pricing from one of two perspectives in general. Dunn and McConnell (1981a and 1981b) 
recognize non-financial prepayment together with ’optimal’ prepayment in pricing MBSs. 
However, their model does not account for mortgagors who do not exercise their options 
when they are in the money. Dunn and Spatt (1986), Johnston and Van Drunen (1988), 
and Timmis (1985) include transaction costs payable on refinancing in their models that 
could account for the above under-exercise. It is clear that non-financial prepayment and 
non-prepayment when optimal are very difficult to be modeled theoretically since they de­
pend on individual circumstances and the cost of refinancing. An alternative perspective 
is to estimate an empirical model with easily observable variables to predict prepayments 
using past prepayment history. An example of this perspective is Schwartz and Torous 
(1989). McConnell and Singh (1993) employ the empirical prepayment model of Schwartz
3‘Optimal’ prepayment assumes that mortgagors will exercise their option as soon as the gain from 
immediate exercise exceeds the value of the option of postponing prepayment
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and Torous (1989) to value the various tranches of CMOs, as opposed to generic MBSs. 
Both perspectives model agency backed MBS and as such treat defaults as if they were 
prepayments.
The private-label securities are subject to default risk as well as prepayment risk. This 
adds another layer of difficulty to the valuation. In theory, the mortgagors have an incentive 
to default on their loans when the house value drops by a fixed amount below the present 
value of future mortgage payments. In practice however, it is found that most mortgagors 
choose not to default even when it is optimal to do so. This could be due to the negative 
effect default has on one’s credit history, personal reputation etc. Here also it is possible to 
have an empirical default model based on past defaults. In fact, Schwartz and Torous (1993) 
employ Poisson regression to estimate the parameters of a proportional hazards model for 
prepayment and default decisions. However, their sample consists solely of agency-backed 
loans. Since whole-loans include a large number of jumbo loans which generally prepay 
faster than agency loans when interest rates decline, whole-loan prepayment behavior is 
different from that of agency-backed loans. A number of investment banks use a multiplier 
greater than one to convert agency prepayment values to whole-loan values (see Table 2).
The purpose of this paper is to employ a logit regression model to value senior-subordinate 
tranches backed by private-label mortgage pools and examine the effect of mortgage pre­
payments and defaults, and changes in interest rates on the value of these tranches. More 
specifically, we estimate empirical functions for prepayment and default of whole-loans 
through logit regression on a sample of pools securitized by Prudential Home Mortgage. 
We also study the effect of interest rate volatilities and the degree of subordination on 
tranche prices. The shifting prepayment structure, explained later, and the sequential re­
tirement of principal from the senior to the lowermost tranche as a result of prepayments 
and from the the lowermost to the senior tranche as a result of defaults make the estima­
tion of cashflows of the tranches very complex. The stochastic nature of these cashflows 
makes the application of backward-looking methods such as the finite-difference method to 
value these tranches impossible. Therefore, one has to resort to Monte Carlo simulation 
for pricing the senior-subordinate tranches.
Section two provides a detailed description of the senior-subordinate structure. Section
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three describes the empirical model for prepayments and defaults. Cash flow estimation 
of the tranches is detailed in section four (The appendix provides a numerical example of 
how the cashflows are estimated). Valuation results are discussed in section five and the 
conclusion appears in the last section.
2 Senior-Subordinated Structure
Senior-subordinated structures are created to provide credit enhancement for the private- 
label mortgage pools. Credit enhancement of the senior class is achieved because the 
subordinated class stands in a first loss position for losses due to defaults and foreclosures 
on loans in the mortgage pool. The size of the senior portion is determined by the credit 
rating agencies so as to enable the entire senior portion to qualify for AAA rating. The 
rating agency analyzes the private-label pool and determines the amount of credit support 
(in other words, the size of the subordinated portion) based on collateral credit quality, 
collateral documentation, loan purpose, property type, geographical area of loans, expected 
future macro-economic conditions, etc. Even with AAA rating, many investors do not 
feel comfortable with the credit risk of the senior class. They believe that the rating 
agency’s subordination requirements might not be sufficient. This has given rise to the 
super-senior structure whereby a layer is stripped from the senior class and is used as 
additional subordination. Since this stripped layer of senior bonds retain the original level 
of subordination, they generally maintain the same AAA rating.
The subordinated tranches are called ‘B pieces’ and can be further stratified based 
upon subordination; the most senior part of a B piece could be rated a single A, the next 
senior part could be rated a BBB and so on4. The size of each sub-tranche is once again a 
function of the collateral quality and the desired rating. The lower the collateral quality, 
the higher the credit protection required for a sub-tranche for a given rating. The lower 
the desired rating, the lower is the credit protection required for a sub-tranche for a given 
collateral pool. As an example, let us assume that for some collateral the AAA, AA, A 
and BBB credit protection levels are 10%, 6%, 4% and 3% respectively. Then the first 90%
4Bonds that are senior to some tranches, but junior to others are called mezzanine.
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of the pool will be issued as AAA bonds, the next 4% (10%-6%) will be AA, the next 2% 
(6%-4%) will be A and the next 1% (4%-3%) will be BBB. The last 3% will be unrated 
or could achieve some lower rating. This process of stratifying the tranches based upon 
subordination is called credit tranching.
To further protect the senior bonds, senior-subordinated structures employ a ‘shifting’ 
interest structure for distributing the prepayments and recoveries from defaults. Shifting 
interest means that the prepayments and recoveries from defaults are not allocated pro­
rata  between the senior and subordinated tranches. In the most common shifting structure, 
the senior tranche receives a pro-rata share of interest, amortized principal, prepayments 
and default recoveries, and a specified percentage of the share of prepayments and default 
recoveries of the subordinate tranches. In a typical schedule, the percentages are 100%, 
70%, 60%, 40%, 20% and 0% in years 1 through 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and after respectively. 
In other words, the subordinate tranches will not receive any prepayments for the first 5 
years and will receive its pro-rata share of the cash flows after year 9. This accelerates 
the amortization of the senior tranche and increases the relative size of the subordinated 
bonds over time, thus increasing the level of protection for the senior bonds. In addition, 
the current level of subordination of each tranche is calculated every month to ensure that 
it is at least as high as the original level. If it is not, amortized principal meant for junior 
tranches is redirected to that tranche till the original level of subordination is restored. A 
by-product of this shifting structure is that the ‘B pieces’ get additional call protection 
from prepayments and their negative convexity and average life variability are significantly 
reduced.
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3 Estim ation of Empirical M odel for Prepaym ents and 
Defaults
As mentioned in the introduction, whole-loans exhibit different prepayment behavior than 
agency-backed loans. Thus, we estimate separate empirical models for the prepayments and 
the defaults of whole-loan mortgages. Data from 23 whole-loan mortgage pools securitized 
by Prudential Home Mortgage between 1988 and 1993 are used for this purpose. The 
average pool size was $314 million and 1747 months of data were available across all the 
pools. Monthly prepayment values were taken directly from monthly CPR prepayment 
data reported on Bloomberg for the pools and the monthly default values of the pools were 
estimated from data obtained from Prudential on individual loans that defaulted.
The variables that can be used in an empirical model for prepayments and defaults are 
limited by the fact that one should be able to simulate the future values of these variables in 
order to use the model in pricing securities. This restricts the number of macro-economic 
variables that can be used. Here, we restrict ourselves to variables that can be derived 
from two stochastic processes - the interest rate process and the housing value process 
- in addition to pool specific variables such as original loan-to-value ratio, coupon rate, 
the fraction of the pool still remaining, etc.5 The variables related to the interest rate 
process that we use are the refinancing rate - by far the most significant predictor of 
prepayment -, the monthly change in the refinancing rate, a measure of the volatility of the 
refinancing rate given by the sum of the squared changes in the refinancing rate over the 
previous three months and the slope of the term structure. Variables associated with the 
housing value process used in our study include the return on the repeat sale housing value 
index, cumulative returns on the housing value index since the inception of the pool, and a 
volatility measure given by the sum of the squared changes in the index over the previous 
three months. The burnout6 variable used is the log of the fraction of the pool remaining
Unemployment rate and GNP growth rate may be very significant in explaining mortgage default 
values, but can be used in the prediction model only if one is prepared to assume different stochastic
processes for each of them in addition to interest rate and housing value processes.
6 Burn out is the tendency of prepayment from premium mortgage pools (i.e. pools with coupon rates
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at any point in time.
Since the prepayment and default values are probabilities, a logit model is used to 
estimate them as a function of the above explanatory variables. Since we are dealing with 
proportions data, and not binary response data, a weighted least squares regression is used 
to estimate the minimum chi-squared estimates of the coefficients (see Greene (1993)). The 
regression results are reported in Table 3.
As mentioned, since the prepayments and defaults in each month are exogenously spec­
ified by the empirical model, the pricing of the mortgage-backed securities can not be done 
by any of the backward-looking methods such as the finite-difference method and the bi­
nomial model. This is because the fraction of the mortgage pool outstanding at any time 
will be a function of prepayments and defaults in prior periods and these depend upon 
prior period interest rates and housing index returns. To apply, say, the finite-difference 
method, the fraction of the pool or face value remaining at any time should be independent 
of prior period variable values. The net result is that only a forward-looking method such 
as Monte Carlo simulation can be used to price MBSs with empirical prepayments and 
defaults. Monte Carlo simulation requires the generation of a short-term interest rate as 
well as all the explanatory variables in the empirical prepayment and default models. The 
following discussion reveals how the variable values are generated.
We assume that the instantaneous riskless rate follows the square-root mean-reverting 
process as specified by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985)7:
dr = k(m  — r) +  oyfrdzT (1)
where
k is the speed of mean reversion,
7n is the steady-state mean and 
a 2 is the instantaneous variance.
The above parameters are estimated using a trial and error process by assuming initial
above the refinancing rate) to slow down over time, all other things being equal.
7With no loss of generality, we can assume that the Local Expectations Hypothesis holds rnul therefore,
regard the interest risk factor as having been absorbed into the values of other interest parameters
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parameter values, estimating the yield curve, and then calculating the sum of squared
errors of the deviations from the actual yield curve. The parameter values are changed
until the sum of squared deviations is minimized.
Given the above process, the interest rate for any maturity, T, can be calculated as 
a function of the short-term risk-less rate (r), k, m  and a  (see Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(1985)). This allows us to calculate the 10-year interest rate as a proxy to the fixed-rate 
mortgage refinancing rate8. Other interest rate-related variables such as the slope of the 
term structure, the volatility of the refinancing rate (This is simply the sum of the squared 
changes) and the change in the refinancing rate are easily estimable.
The mortgage house value dynamics is assumed to be given by
dH  =  ( jj, — b)Hdt + Gfidzii (2)
with
(dzr)(dzfi) =  pdt (3)
where
p  is the instantaneous expected housing rate of return, 
b is the housing payout rate (rent, for example), 
a 2H is the instantaneous variance of housing returns and 
p is the instantaneous correlation coefficient between the 
increments to the standardized Wiener processes dzT and dzu- 
dH /H  gives us a proxy for the housing index return. As is generally done in this literature 
(see Schwartz and Torous (1992) and Cunningham and Hendershott (1984)), p  is assumed 
to be 0.1, b to be 0.05 and cr# to be 0.05.
The next section reveals how the cashflows of each tranche are estimated given these 
rates. The price of each tranche is simply the discounted present value of these cashflows.
810-year rate is a slightly better predictor of the fixed-rate mortgage rates than the 30-year rate. A 
regression of the mortgage rate against the 10-year rate gives an R 2 of 0.87 as opposed to 0.84 for the 
30-year rate. Based on the regression, we have, mortgage rate= 2.495 +  0.9195i?io-j,r
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4 Cashflow Estim ation of the Tranches
We assume that the private-label pool backing the senior-subordinated bonds consists of 
a large number of equally sized, fixed rate, fully prepayable, fully amortizing mortgages. 
Let ^ ( 0 )  be the face value of the pool of mortgages at origination, c be the fixed monthly 
coupon rate on the mortgages and let T  be the term to maturity in months. Let A, the 
scheduled payment, be the amortized principal and interest paid out in every month. If no 
loans are prepaid and there are no defaults, then A  is given by
A- J ^ r )  <4>
and the principal remaining at time t  if no loans are prepaid and defaulted is
(0 =  —(1 “  e~ci-T~t)) (5)
c
But the prepayments and defaults reduce the fraction of loans outstanding in each month 
and thereby reduce the scheduled payment in each month over time. Let y(t) be the fraction 
of the pool outstanding, ir(t) be the prepayment rate, y(t) be the default rate in month t 
and a  be the constant default recovery rate9. Then,
y(t) = y { t~  l ) ( l - 7 r ( f )  - j ( t ) )  (6)
The scheduled payment in month t now becomes,
cFo (0)y(t)
W (1 -  e~c(T~t'>) ' }
the remaining principal is,
Fa (t) =  ^ ( 1  -  e~c(7’-d) (8)
c
and the pool cash flow in month t is,
CF(t) = A ( t) +  Fa (t -  1)(*■(*) +  «7(*)) (9)
9Wlien a loan is defaulted and the property is foreclosed, a fraction of the remaining principal of the 
loan is recovered, net of all legal and foreclosure costs. This fraction is called the recovery rate. Here we 
assume that the default recovery is made immediately. In reality, it takes several months. But this should 
not make any significant difference to our results.
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Assume that there is one senior tranche, with initial face value, /^(O), and coupon, cs, 
and three subordinated tranches with initial face values 3 i(0 ) ,  Fj2{0) and Fj3(0) and with 
coupons Cji, Cj2 and cj3 respectively. The shifting interest structure means that the senior 
tranche gets a percentage, p(t), of the junior tranches’ share of prepayment in the first 9 
years.
1.00, when 0 < t  <  60 
0.70, when 60 < t < 72 
0.60, when 72 <  t < 84
p(t) = < (10)
0.40, when 84 < t < 96
0.20, when 96 < t  < 108 
. 0.00, when t > 108
So in any month t, the senior tranche would receive a fraction, ps(t), of the prepayment 
and default recoveries,
n (+\ — Pit) 1 -I \
No coupon payments are made on the principal that is prepaid and recovered from default 
between months t  and t —  1. This means that in order to calculate the coupon payment 
due on each tranche, one has to calculate the principal remaining on each tranche after the 
prepayments and default recoveries have been deducted, but before the amortized principal 
is subtracted. Let this be F*(t) and F*k(t), (k =  1,2,3) respectively for the senior and 
junior tranches. Then,
F,(t) =  Fs(t -  1) -  Fa{t -  l)(ir(t)p,(t) +  7 {t)Min{ps(t), «)) (12)
Fj3{t) =  Fj3(t -  1) -  Fa{t -  1)(tt(*)(1 -  p,(t)) +  (a -  ps(t)))
< 1 3 >
^7fc(*) =  Fjk{t -  1) -  Fc (t -  l ) ( 7 r ( i ) ( l  -  ps(t)) + 7 ( f ) iV /a x (0 ,  ( «  -  ps(t) ) )
M * - .1). )>k = 2,3  (14)
E k Fjk(t -  1)'
Once we have F*(t)s, we can calculate F ( t )s by subtracting the amortized principal. For 
the whole pool, the amortized principal payment in month t  is,
AP(t) ~  A(t) -  Fc {t -  1)(1 -  7r(t) -  y(t))c (15)
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m  =  f ; W -  F;{/ ™ F . {t) (i6)
^ = F U t ) - A P {t ) F^ - ^ m k = U 2,3 (17)
Cash flows for the various tranches in month t will be
F*(t)
CFs(t) =  F ; (t)c3+ A P (t) F m^  ^ ^  ( t - 1 ) (?r{t)ps(t) + 7 ft)M iw (p,(t), a ) ) (18)
= fJi (t)cji + Xi>(t)J ^ ^ l l ^  + F0( « - l ) ( )r(t) ( l -p ,( t ) )
+ „ Ff '-v~- Xl -.-Max(0, (a -  p,(t)))), k = 1,2,3 (19)
Ljfc ~  lj
If prepayment rates are moderately high during the mortgage life, the senior tranche will 
be retired before maturity. As a result, the cash flows and and the outstanding principal 
values will undergo changes to reflect the absence of cash flows to the senior tranche. All 
the prepayments and default recoveries will be shared pro-rata by all the junior tranches. 
But tranche 3 will continue to bear all the losses from defaults. If the default rate is high
enough, it is likely that tranche 3 will be retired. In that case, tranche 2 will start to
take on the default losses. In the unlikely event that all junior tranches are retired, the 
senior tranche will be hit with the default losses. Also, as mentioned before, each tranche is 
subjected to a ‘subordination test’ in each month. If the tranche fails the test, prepayments 
due to the lower tranches are redirected to this tranche until this condition is satisfied.10
Then,
5 Valuation Results
We consider a senior-subordinated structure backed by a pool of 30-year fixed-rate private-
label mortgages with a coupon rate of eight percent11. The structure is assumed to have
four tranches; one senior, S, with a face value equal to 90% of the pool face value and
10A simple example in appendix demonstrates the allocation of the cash flows to the various tranches 
and the principle of shifting of prepayment structure.
11 The servicing fee is assumed to be 0.5% of the principal outstanding per year.
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three subordinate tranches, namely, J l ,  J2 and J3 with face values equal to 5%, 3% and 
2% of the mortgage pool respectively. All four tranches are assumed to have a coupon rate 
of seven percent. This equal-coupon assumption makes it easy to compare the values of 
the tranches, but makes no material difference to the results. As previously mentioned, a 
shifting interest structure is employed to distribute the cashflows from prepayments and 
defaults. But the default losses are deducted from J3 until it is exhausted and then from 
J2 and so on. The excess coupon payments from the mortgage pool are assumed to go to 
a ‘residual’ tranche.
The values of the tranches are determined by averaging the values from 10,000 Monte 
Carlo trials. Each trial traces a random interest rate path based on the CIR interest 
rate process and a random repeat sales housing index value path based on the previously 
specified diffusion process.
Refinancing Rates
Table 4 shows the values of the different tranches as a percentage of the face value of 
the respective tranches for various values of the interest (refinancing) rates (see Figure 1 
also). The generic MBS value is the value of a simple MBS backed by the mortgage pool 
and with the same 7% coupon as the senior-subordinate tranches. In other words, it is 
the value of the senior tranche with no subordination. The effect of subordination on the 
senior tranche can be measured by comparing its value with the value of the MBS. The 
first thing to note is that the S tranche is valued at a premium to the MBS, justifying 
the subordination. J3 is valued comparatively much lower than the other tranches since it 
bears almost all the default losses. J2, which is next-in-line for the default losses, is only 
slightly affected by defaults.
A fall in refinancing rates results in an increase in prepayments as can be seen in Panel 
B, but this effect is overwhelmed by the discounting effect of lower interest rates. As a 
result, tranches S, J l ,  and J2 are valued at far above their face values when low interest 
rates prevail. If all the mortgages are prepaid at the lower interest rates, this would not be 
the case. But since only a fraction of the mortgages prepay when the rates are low, these 
tranches continue to enjoy the high, original coupon rates. Also, S has, rather counter­
intuitively, lower values than the riskier J l  and J2 tranches at lower interest rates. This is
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due to the fact that S is retired earlier than the other tranches (see the weighted ages in 
Panel B) and therefore, can not enjoy the high coupons in a low-interest environment as 
long as the other tranches. In addition, the default losses hardly affect J l .
Prepayment primarily affects tranche S. Its weighted average life triples as the interest 
rate goes from 6.5 to 10%, whereas those of J l  and J2 go up by a little more than 10% 
(see figure 2). This is clearly due to the shifting of prepayment structure, whereby tranche 
S receives the bulk of the pool prepayments in the first 10 years. The increase in defaults 
(as interest rates go up) is sufficient to decrease the age of J3 by almost half. The overall 
result is that the senior tranche is subject to severe contraction risk, whereas the junior 
tranches 1 and 2 provide relatively far more stable cashflows regardless of the prepayment 
rates as can be clearly seen in Figure 2.
Another important observation is that the S tranche value is lower than that with no 
subordination (generic MBS value) at all interest rates.
Interest Rate Volatility
Table 5 looks at the effect of interest rate volatility on the senior-subordinated structure. 
The volatility that we consider here is the volatility parameter, aT, used in the CIR interest 
rate process to generate the interest rate path for simulation. We find that the total 
prepayments increase by more than 20% as the parameter value is increased from 0.04 to 
0.06. This is to be expected because higher volatility would result in bigger jumps in both 
downward and upward directions and therefore, lead to higher prepayments since higher 
interest rates have relatively small impact on prepayments. But surprisingly, the total 
defaults almost double as the volatility parameter is increased. The only explanation is 
that the mtgvar variable acts as a proxy for an excluded variable in the default regression. 
M ean  R eversion  P a ra m e te r
Mean reversion parameter is the speed at which the short-term interest rate reaches 
the long run mean and is represented by k in the CIR interest rate process. The lower 
this speed, the higher the volatility. Table 6 reports the results when k is increased from 
0.02 to 0.08. The total prepayments almost halve, but unlike Table 3, the senior tranche 
value is unaffected in comparison to J l  value. This is because here the prepayments occur 
gradually over the mortgage m aturity whereas in Table 3 a significant portion of it was
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immediate due to the low current refinancing rate.
S h ifting  P re p a y m e n t S tru c tu re
Under the shifting of prepayments (or shifting interest structure) a significant portion of 
the pro-rata share of prepayment and default recoveries due to the subordinates is diverted 
to the senior tranche during the first ten years. This accelerates the amortization of the 
senior tranche and increases the degree of subordination (face value of subordinates over 
that of senior) over time, protecting the senior tranche investor. In order to study the effect 
of the shifting of prepayments, we consider the case with no shifting and re-estimate the 
values in Table 4. The results are shown in Table 7.
A comparison of panel B in Tables 4 and 7 reveals that the relative age of the senior 
tranche is shorter with shifting (see Figure 3). At lower interest rates, which implies high 
prepayments, the subordinate tranches are retired twice as fast with no-shifting (see Figure
4) and Jl,especially, has no longer any protection from contraction risk. Even at high 
interest rates, the weighted age of the subordinate tranches are 30% lower. This clearly 
shows that in the absence of prepayment shifting, the subordinate tranches are retired 2-3 
times faster and as a result, the senior tranche is left more vulnerable to default losses. But 
an inspection of panel A in Tables 4 and 7 reveals that the incorporation of shifting interest 
structure does very little to increase the senior tranche value. In fact, at low interest rates 
and at current coupon the senior tranche exhibits higher value with no shifting (see Figure
5). In addition to this, the senior tranche has higher values than J l  and generic MBS for 
all interest rates, discount and premium. This is because the potential loss from defaults, 
even without the protection from shifting, is very small and the longer weighted age of the 
senior tranche in the no-shifting case allows it to enjoy the higher coupons at the lower 
interest rates for a longer time. In addition, the requirement that the senior tranche be 
paid its pro-rata share of the total principal upon default ensures that tranche J 1 will stay 
alive longer on average than tranche S and act as a buffer against losses.
W ith no shifting of prepayments, J l  and J2 loses value at lower interest rates (see Figure
6) since they no longer have protection from contraction risk. But in the absence of shifting, 
the value of the J3 increases at most interest rates since more of its principal gets retired 
through prepayments rather than through default losses. D egree o f S u b o rd in a tio n
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Here we look at the values of the senior tranche as the degree of subordination is 
increased from 0 to 10% with the refinancing rate constant and equal to the coupon rate 
(par coupon). This analysis is analogous to choosing the optimal degree of subordination 
at the time of issuance of the tranches. We would like to see if the increased protection 
for tranche S results in an increased value for that tranche. It is seen in Table 8 and in 
Figure 7 that as the subordination is increased, the value of the senior tranche increases, 
reaches a peak, and then decreases. The highest value for the senior tranche is realized for 
a degree of subordination between four and five percent. So if subordination is increased 
beyond this optimum, the value loss from contraction risk more than offsets the value of 
enhanced protection from default. This value loss is caused by the fact that a greater 
degree of subordination results in larger shifting of prepayments and earlier retirement or 
contraction of the senior tranche. Thus, the senior tranche gets additional protection; but 
this is not reflected in the senior tranche values. Obviously, the protection from additional 
subordination adds little value to the tranche since the threat of loss from default is already 
extremely small.
6 Conclusion
This paper values the tranches of a senior-subordinated structure backed by a pool of 
whole-loan mortgages through Monte Carlo simulation. Empirical models for whole-loan 
prepayments and defaults are estimated using monthly data on a sample of 30-year, fixed 
rate, whole-loan mortgage pools. The valuation uses these empirically estimated prepay­
ment and default functions and the one-factor CIR interest rate process. Values of a senior 
tranche and three subordinate tranches are analyzed by changing the refinancing rate and 
other parameters. Interest rate volatility and the mean reversion parameter affect both 
prepayments and defaults rather significantly. But the relative value of the senior tranche 
is unaffected by these variables. The senior tranche, as well as all other tranches, are 
affected by refinancing rates, but mostly via the discounting effect rather than the prepay­
ment effect. It is seen that the senior tranche has a lower value than the seniormost junior 
tranche at lower interest rates. This is because as a result of shifting of prepayments the
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senior tranche suffers from increased contraction risk at lower interest rates. It is retired 
earlier and therefore, has to be reinvested at lower rates.
This means that the shifting interest structure adds value to the senior tranche value 
only for discount coupons. Even though it provides enhanced protection from default to 
the senior tranche, this additional protection seems to have a negative net value for par 
and also premium coupons due to the additional contraction risk. The structure, in fact, 
serves to increase the value of the seniormost junior tranche by giving it protection from 
contraction risk.
Those who securitize non-agency mortgages want to offer as large a fraction of the face 
value of the pool as possible as the senior tranche with protection from default loss. For 
a given level of subordination, protection to the senior tranche can be enhanced through 
the use of the shifting of prepayments feature. However, the previously mentioned cost 
of the shifting of prepayments has to be taken into account in the design of the senior- 
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A p p en d ix
This section demonstrates the cash flow allocations to the four tranches upon prepayment and default by 
means of a simple example. There are ten mortgages of $1,000 each that form a pool of size $10,000. The 
pool is divided into four tranches with the following sizes: S =  $9,000, J l =  $500, J2 =  $300 and J3 =  
$200. The coupon rate for the mortgages as well as the tranches is assumed to be 10% and all payments 
are yearly. The maturity of the loans is 10 years. There is a shifting of prepayments in the first five years 
to protect the senior tranche. The structure is as follows. 100% of the prepayments and default recoveries 
due to the junior tranches in the first two years is shifted to the senior tranche, 50% in the next two years, 
25% in the next year and none in the next 5 years. Two of the loans are assumed to prepay in the second 
year, one in the fourth, one in the fifth, one in the sixth and one in the seventh. One of the loans is assumed 
to default in the fourth year- and another in the seventh. The default recovery is 60%. The cash flows and 
end-of-year balances are as follows.
S J l J2 J3
year annual paymt prepayment default cf bal cf bal cf bal cf bal
1 1627 0 0 1465 8435 81 469 49 281 33 187
2 1627 1736 0 3201 6078 81 434 49 260 33 174
3 1302 0 0 1139 5546 81 396 49 238 33 158
4 1302 709 709 2229 3872 104 332 62 65 41 0
5 976 617 0 1459 2798 112 253 22 50 0 0
6 814 516 0 1200 1877 109 170 21 33 0 0
7 651 405 405 1195 810 86 0 17 0 0 0
8 325 0 0 325 565 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 325 0 0 325 296 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 325 0 0 325 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0
Annual paymt is the amortized annual payment for the pool, cf is the tranche cash flow for the year and 
bal is the tranche principal balance at the end of the year.
Note that in the second year, the junior tranches do not receive anything out of $1736 prepaid. In year 4, 
the default of one loan means that there is a loss of 709(1 — 0.6) =  $284. This loss is enough to wipe out all 
the principal of the tranche .J3 and part of J2. Default in year 7 results in a loss of 405(1 — 0.6) =  $162 and 
this wipes out tranches J l and J2. This example clearly shows that but for the shifting of prepayment in 
the first 5 years, a large portion of the default loss in year 7 would have been born by the senior tranche.
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Table 1
Non-Agency MBS Issuance and Credit Enhancement Types
year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
issuance 11.1 15.9 14.2 24.4 49.7 89.5 96.6
subordination 30 79 62 49 51 48 85
reserve fund 0 0 0 0 19 17 1
pool insurance 0 4 10 23 10 28 11
letter of credit 0 0 13 15 5 1 0
surety bonds 18 4 2 4 0 2 2
corp guarantee 52 13 12 3 0 0 0
Issuance is in billions of dollars per year 
Credit enhancement types are in percentages
Table 2









Source: Bear Stearns and Co., “Prepayment of Whole-Loan Securities,” June 4, 1993.
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Table 3
Logit Regression Results of Prepayments and Defaults of Whole-loans
Regression results of prepayments and defaults using monthly data on 23 whole-loan pools issued by 
Prudential Home Mortgage are reported here. The pools, all issued between 1988 and 1993, are backed by 
30-year fixed-rate mortgages. The regressions are carried out using the model logit(p) =  /?x where x  is the 

























where refdel is the difference betweeii the coupon rate and the refinancing rate if this difference is positive 
and zero otherwise, mtgdiff is the change in the refinancing rate from the previous month, mtgvar is the 
refinancing rate variance calculated as the sum of the squared changes in the rates over the previous three 
months, logfac is the log of the fraction of the original loans remaining, slope is the slope of the yield 
curve calculated as the difference between the 30-year treasury rate and the 90-day T-bill rate, hret is the 
monthly percentage change in the average resale value of existing homes, hcret is the cumulative return 
on the above housing index since the inception of the pool, hvar is the housing index variance calculated 
as the sum of the squared changes in the index over the previous three months, seas is a dummy variable 
that has a value of one during months May-October and zero otherwise mid Uv is the original average 
loan-to-value ratio of the pool.
The standard errors are given hi brackets.
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Effect o f Refinancing R ate on the Value of Tranches and on Prepayment and
Default
Table 4
Whole-loan mortgage pool: coupon =  8%, maturity =  30yrs, servicing fee =  0.05%, 
Default recovery rate =  0.4, loan-to-value ratio =  0.80
Face value of the tranches/face value of the pool: S  =  90%, J l  =  5%, J2  =  3%, JZ  =  2% 
All tranches have the same coupon rate of 7%.
CIR interest rate parameters: k  =  0.08, m =  0.1, cr — 0.05 
Housing value dynamics parameters: fi — 0.10, b =  0.05, <th  — 0.05 
P an el A:
Value of tranches
refin rate S J l J2 J3 Generic MBS
Par 8.0 106.26 107.86 98.56 35.80 104.69
Premium 7.0 108.83 117.19 113.13 54.83 108.29
6.5 106.20 119.95 119.01 77.15 106.69
Discount 9.0 99.99 99.11 88.99 30.85 98.22
10.0 93.79 91.26 81.46 29.85 91.99
P an el B:
Value-weighted age of the tranches in years1
refin rate S Jl J2 J3 Gen MBS prepayment2 default3
Par 8.0 11.98 17.49 15.41 4.94 12.22 47.87 4.69
Premium 7.0 7.89 17.05 16.18 7.10 8.58 64.57 3.27
6.5 3.91 15.32 15.12 8.89 4.92 80.51 1.95
Discount 9.0 12.70 17.58 15.07 4.47 12.85 44.33 5.15.
10.0 12.96 17.59 14.85 4.48 13.08 42.91 5.42
Generic MBS is the security if the pool is sold as one single tranche, in other words, it is senior tranche 
with no subordination.
1 The principal paid off in each month is multiplied by the age of the loan in that month, aggregated, 
and divided by the total value of principal to create a value-weighted age of the tranches. This measure 
is superior to the actual age of the tranches because tranches can linger on for quite some time with very 
small amounts of principal.
2 Prepayment is the total principal prepaid through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
3 Default is the total principal defaulted (but not the actual loss) through maturity as a percentage of the 
face value of the pool.
10,000 simulation runs were conducted for each valuation. Values are calculated at time 0.
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Effect of Interest Rate Volatility on the Value of Tranches and on Prepayment
and Default
Table 5
Whole-loan mortgage pool: coupon =  8%, maturity =  30yrs, servicing fee =  0.05%, 
current refinancing rate =  8%, loan-to-value ratio =  0.80, default recovery rate =  0.4 
Face value of the tranches/face value of the pool: S  =  90%, J l  =  5%, J2  =  3%, <73 =  2%
All tranches have the same coupon rate of 7%. CIR interest rate parameters: k  =  0.08, m =  0.1 
Housing value dynamics parameters: n — 0.10, 6 =  0.05, (Jh  — 0.05 
P an el A:
Value of tranches
Volatility1 S J l J2 J3 Generic MBS
0.04 106.52 107.68 103.69 41.99 105.20
0.05 106.26 107.86 98.56 35.80 104.69
0.06 105.50 105.05 87.66 31.46 103.37
P anel B:
Value-weighted age of the tranches in years1
Volatility S Jl J2 J3 Gen MBS prepayment2 default3
0.04 12.92 17.97 17.12 6.10 13.16 43.46 3.65
0.05 11.98 17.49 15.41 4.94 12.22 47.87 6.92
0.06 10.61 15.70 12.24 3.87 10.78 53.82 7.42
1 The principal paid off in each month is multiplied by the age of the loan in that month, aggregated, 
and divided by the total value of principal to create a value-weighted age of the tranches. This measure 
is superior to the actual age of the tranches because tranches can linger on for quite some time with very 
small amounts of principal.
2 Prepayment is the total principal prepaid through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
3 Default is the total principal defaulted through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
10,000 simulation runs were conducted for each valuation.
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Effect of Interest Rate Mean Reversion Parameter on the Value of Tranches
and on Prepayment and Default
Table 6
Whole-loan mortgage pool: coupon =  8%, maturity =  30yrs, servicing fee =  0.05%, 
current refinancing rate =  8%, loan-to-value ratio =  0.80, default recovery rate =  0.4 
Face value of the tranches/face value of the pool: S  =  90%, J l  =  5%, J2 =  3%, J3 =  2%
All tranches have the same coupon rate of 7%. CIR interest rate parameters: k  =  0.08, m =  0.10, a  =  0.05 
Housing value dynamics parameters: p  — 0.10, b =  0.05, a n  =  0.05 
P a n el A:
Value of tranches
Mean reversion S J l J2 J3 Generic MBS
0.02 102.12 103.81 96.49 59.73 101.12
0.05 105.19 109.15 98.11 42.94 103.89
0.08 106.26 107.86 98.56 38.80 104.69
P an el B:
Value-weighted age of the tranches in years1
Mean reversion S •Jl J2 J3 Gen MBS prepayment2 default3
0.02 2.95 7.29 6.11 2.93 3.27 88.89 3.70
0.05 7.66 14.04 11.87 4.46 8.04 68.95 4.72
0.08 11.98 17.49 15.41 4.94 12.22 47.87 4.69
where mean reversion is the mean reversion parameter in the CIR interest rate process.
1 The principal paid off in each month is multiplied by the age of the loan in that month, aggregated, 
and divided by the total value of principal to create a value-weighted age of the tranches. This measure 
is superior to the actual age of the tranches because tranches can linger on for quite some time with very 
small amounts of principal.
2 Prepayment is the total principal prepaid through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
3 Default is the total principal defaulted through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
10,000 simulation runs were conducted for each valuation.
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Effect o f Shifting Prepayment Structure on the Value of Tranches (Table 4 
Repeated with no Shifting of Prepayments to the Senior Structure
Table 7
Wkole-loan mortgage pool: coupon =  8%, maturity =  30yrs, servicing fee =  0.05%, 
default recovery rate =  0.4, loan-to-value ratio =  0.80
Face value of tlie tranches/face value of the pool: S  =  90%, J l  =  5%, J2 =  3%, J3 =  2% 
All tranches have the same coupon rate of 7%.
CIR interest rate parameters: k  =  0.08, m  =  0.1, a  — 0.05 
Housing value dynamics parameters: n  =  0.10, b =  0.05, uh — 0.05 
P an el A:
Value of tranches
refin rate S J l J2 J3 Generic MBS
Par 8.0 106.44 105.61 92.29 43.03 104.69
Premium 7.0 109.64 109.12 99.10 59.45 108.29
6.5 107.55 107.30 101.14 75.12 106.69
Discount 9.0 99.95 98.95 85.69 38.22 98.22
10.0 93.61 92.44 80.20 37.39 91.99
P an el B:
Value-weighted age of the tranches in years1
refin rate S J l J2 J3 Gen MBS prepayment2 default3
Par 8.0 12.49 12.43 9.69 3.33 12.22 47.87 4.69
Premium 7.0 8.76 8.74 6.86 2.59 8.58 64.57 3.27
6.5 5.02 4.99 3.89 1.62 4.92 80.51 1.95
Discount 9.0 13.15 13.02 9.97 3.26 12.85 44.33 5.15
10.0 13.39 13.14 9.99 3.33 13.08 42.91 5.42
1 The principal paid off in each month is multiplied by the age of the loan in that mouth, aggregated, 
and divided by the total value of principal to create a value-weighted age of the tranches. This measure 
is superior to the actual age of the tranches because tranches can linger on for quite some time with very 
small amounts of principal.
2 Prepayment is the total principal prepaid through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
3 Default is the total principal defaulted through maturity as a percentage of the face value of the pool.
10,000 simulation runs were conducted for each valuation.
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Table 8
Effect o f Degree of Subordination on the Value of Tranches
Whole-loan mortgage pool: coupon =  8%, maturity =  30yrs, servicing fee =  0.05%, 
default recovery rate =  0.4, loan-to-value ratio =  0.80
Face value of the tranches/face value of the pool: S  =  Fa%, J l  =  0.5(100 -  Fa)%, J2  =  0.3(100 -  Fa)%, 
JZ  =  0.2(100 -  Fa)%
All tranches have the same coupon rate of 7%.
CIR interest rate parameters: k  =  0.08, rn =  0.1, a  — 0.05 
Housing value dynamics parameters: n  — 0.10, b =  0.05, <jh  =  0.05
Value of tranches
Subordination % S J l J2 J3 Generic MBS
0 104.69 - - - 104.69
1 105.58 26.25 16.18 11.30 104.69
2 106.10 55.35 24.90 10.36 104.69
3 106.30 79.86 37.52 11.96 104.69
4 106.34 94.65 51.17 14.55 104.69
5 106.34 101.97 63.87 17.63 104.69
6 106.33 105.27 74.67 21.07 104.69
8 106.30 107.34 89.99 28.28 104.69
10 106.26 107.86 98.56 35.80 104.69
All calculations are for par coupon i.e. with a refinancing rate of 8%
10,000 simulation runs were conducted for each valuation.
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Figure 1
Effect of Refinancing Rate on the Value of Tranches (with Shifting of Prepayments)
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Figure 2
Effect of Refinancing Rate on the Value-Weighted Age of Tranches (with Shifting of
Prepayments)












Effect of Shifting of Prepayments on the Value-Weighted Age of Senior Tranche
Value Weighted Age of Tranches (Years)
Refinancing Rate
Figure 4
Effect of Shifting of Prepayments on the Value-Weighted Age of Junior Tranches
Value Weighted Age of Tranches (Years)
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Figure 5
Effect of Shifting of Prepayments on Senior Tranche Value
Value of Senior Tranche with and without Shifting
Refinancing Rate
Figure 6
Effect of Shifting of Prepayments on Junior Tranche Values
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Figure 7
Effect of Degree of Subordination on Senior Tranche Value
Assumptions:
- Degree of subordination is increased from 0% to 10%
- Refinancing rate is constant and equal to the coupon rate (par coupon)
Effect of Degree of Subordination of Senior Tranche Value
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